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Abstract 
This article applies Marx’s concept of the fetish generally and technological fetishism 
specifically to how digital ICTs are influencing the craft of journalism. A theoretical 
analysis of technological fetishism is linked to the findings of a 2013 survey among 
Canadian journalistic workers. These workers are found to hold mixed and often 
contradictory views on how digital technologies are shaping their work and profession. 
We understand ICTs as constitutive of journalism and as a technological fetish which 
mediates its development. In this context, the survey respondents are not ‘wrong’ to 
recognize that digital technologies seem to possess inherent powers. Because the 
fetishization of digital technologies is rooted in the social relations of contemporary 
journalism and neoliberal capitalism, redressing these is what needs to be strategically 
prioritized. Indeed, both critical thought (applied to the concept of technological 
fetishism) and political action are needed if the deleterious transformations taking place 
in journalism are to be modified and the democratizing potentials of digital ICTs fully 
realized.  
 
Over the last two decades, digital technologies have been used in ways that have transformed the 
craft and business of journalism. As with other media activities, the future of print, broadcast and, 
indeed, online journalism is an open question. While the development and use of such technologies 
are implicated in the restructuring of news organizations and the search for new business models 
and revenue streams, they are also playing a constitutive role in how journalists understand their 
work and journalism in general. 
 This article, drawing on the findings of a 2013 online national survey of over three hundred 
Canadian journalists examines how digital information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
help to constitute the thinking and political capacities of journalistic workers. To this end, we 
combine the survey’s empirical findings with a critical analysis of technological fetishism. Our 
central argument is that the precarious conditions experienced by journalists are both understood 
and occluded through the fetish. 
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The survey demonstrates an array of perspectives concerning the state of the craft/profession. 
Some respondents are extremely concerned, others remarkably celebratory, but almost all express 
the view that new technologies are inherently powerful forces. To comprehend these views, we 
reference hundreds of the written comments provided and interpret them using the fetish and other 
useful concepts. We argue that different journalists occupy different positions of security or 
precariousness, organization or atomization, and experience degrees of what we call 'engulfment' 
[1]. Because of these factors, different journalists have different conceptual capacities, all of which 
are being mediated through the fetish.  
In what follows we present the survey's more germane findings before explaining the concept of 
the fetish generally and technological fetishism specifically. This is followed by a more nuanced 
and, in places, speculative analysis of both the survey's results and the political implications of 
technological fetishism for journalism and journalistic workers. 
The Survey 
From September 4 to October 14, 2013, an online survey of 343 Canadian journalists was 
conducted on their use of digital technologies. Self-selected journalists, who either received an 
email invitation or responded to notices posted on public listservs (the survey also was publicized 
by the Canadian Media Guild), answered 50 questions [2]. Among the respondents, ‘reporter’ is 
most commonly used as a means of primary self-identification (12.3%), followed by ‘editor’ 
(10.7%), and then ‘writer’ (8.3%). Among the many who identify themselves with several jobs 
(constituting 33.7% of all participants), many respondents call themselves ‘writers’ (46.4%) while 
almost half (48.2%) use the term ‘freelancer’.  
 In reporting how they are paid, only 57.9% say they receive a salary while two-thirds 
(66.4%) report their employment incomes to be insufficient. Predictably, a positive relationship was 
found to exist between those who were not paid a salary and those who reported a sense of  
professional insecurity (significant at the .001 level). Respondents paid for their work on a per-
piece basis or paid by the word conveyed more insecurity than others. Almost half of the survey's 
respondents (47.7%) state that their incomes are “less than adequate” to cover their living expenses 
(in fact, 74.5% indicated some form of dependency on non-employment income) [3]. 
 According to the survey, the wages and salaries needed to pay journalists to practice their 
craft and sustain them as professionals appear unsustainable. A remarkable 42.2% do not foresee 
themselves working in journalism after the year 2022 and those who are pessimistic about their 
future outnumber those who are optimistic (51.5% vs. 43.6%). Yet, when asked questions about 
their current jobs, just 6% say they have little or no autonomy, while 86% view their work to be 
valuable to society in ways that transcend its economic impact. As one respondent puts it, the 
“Press is important in a functioning democracy – digital journalism in particular, as it breaks down 
barriers for people who won't wade through a wall of text on a paper.” 
 In broad terms, the survey reveals what may appear to be somewhat contradictory 
perspectives. On the one hand, most journalistic workers are dissatisfied with their incomes and the 
precariousness of their careers. On the other, they appreciate their craft, its contributions to society, 
and the autonomy they report from experience. On the basis of these findings, a diversity of views 
appear to be at hand. As one respondent summarized his/her career: “Great opportunities, low pay”.   
 Arguably, such dichotomous interpretations of the state of journalistic labour are even more 
apparent when reading comments in response to the following survey request - Briefly describe the 
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effect digital technology has had on your work and workload. Here is a small sample of the 
answers: 
“It has completely changed the nature of every element of what I do.” 
“Digital technology puts a constant deadline on the shoulders of journalists, meaning 
more stories need to be done and faster.” 
“It's added to my job, but made me more productive. But has downgraded society's 
belief that they should pay for information.” 
“It's been great. It makes me more mobile, faster, better researched, and more 
effective.” 
“Digital technology has cheapened the craft of journalism. Everyone is a writer; 
therefore nobody feels it necessary to pay money for writers.” 
“Increased workload. Decreased quality of journalism. Cut down on time to verify 
sources and think before you write.” 
Despite obvious differences, these and many other comments regarding digital ICTs express an 
implicit or explicit understanding of technology as a force or agent in journalistic labour. As is 
commonplace in Canadian society (and many others, of course), things, including technologies, 
often are spoken about and treated as if they are inherently powerful. This is what Marx, in his 
assessment of the commodity, called a fetish. Importantly, both for Marx and for our purposes, to 
recognize the existence of fetishistic thinking is not to simplistically reference the presence of some 
form of delusion. Instead, the fetish – including the technological fetish that arguably is pervasive 
among contemporary journalists – is both an outcome and a constitutive element of journalist-
employer and journalist-consumer/citizen relationships. To explain the significance of this, we turn 
to more theoretical concerns.    
Conceptualizing the fetish and technological fetishism 
When something is experienced as an 'in itself' rather than of the outcome of social agency, it 
becomes a seemingly independent fact of life. This thinking stems from the very socialness of 
human reality; by our creation, organization, and use of the things and structures that we construct. 
Once these mediate our lives they also, prospectively, shape existential realities. Reified 
technologies (or religious beliefs, social customs, etc.) thus come to be encountered and utilized as 
objective taken-for-granted facticities (Berger and Pullberg, 1965). 
 Beyond this tendency, things, such as technologies, can also be invested with powers they 
do not possess inherently. As a technology or technique is registered and lived with – because it is 
used, thought of, and treated as if it is powerful – it in effect exercises power. Comprehending this 
condition is not reducible to some kind of real/unreal assessment. In Marx's concept of commodity 
fetishism, for example, the notion that commodities have autonomous powers is not treated as some 
kind of twisted condition of the mind. Instead, it is an experiential outcome of social life itself. Not 
only, according to Marx, does “the social character of men's labour” appear to have “an objective 
character [...] the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them 
as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour” 
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(Marx, 1977: 77). Marx is arguing that it is “a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in 
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things” (Marx, 1977: 321) (emphases added) [4]. 
 Fetishization is more than just reification. The latter, to repeat, concerns the taken-for-
grantedness of human creations and the erasure of a conscious history concerning them. With the 
fetish, however, a more complex reality is at play. Under capitalism, relations between people are 
relatively mediated while those between things are more direct. Marx argued that what such 
(material) relational conditions yield socially and conceptually cannot be dismissed as mere 
delusions. He was well aware, for example, that the ever-calculating utilitarian (indeed, “rational”) 
bourgeois individual in the nineteenth century recognized that money is not inherently powerful yet 
in his/her social activity such an individual conveyed (to others and him/herself) the opposite. The 
individual is not, to put it directly, ignorant of the fact that money is a voucher entitling the holder 
to a share of the social product. Instead, as Slavoj Žižek summarizes, through “your social reality, 
by means of your participation in social exchange, you bear witness to the uncanny fact that a 
commodity really appears to you as a magical object endowed with special powers” (1998) [5]. In 
this sense, the fetish is something that, upon reflection, most know or have the capacity to know is 
false even though such people, through the conditions of their social relations, act as if the fetish is 
true.  
 More generally, the conditions and relations necessary for fetishistic thinking are pervasive 
in capitalist political economies. This association should be kept in mind as it enables us to fully 
comprehend how and why journalists, their employers, state officials and others represent and 
conceptualize digital ICTs as they do. In keeping with neoliberal economic policies, powerful 
corporate interests have developed and implemented these technologies to increase labour 
efficiencies, reduce costs, and expand or accelerate consumption. Indeed, the past decade has seen 
enormous upheaval in newsrooms across North America; tens of thousands of journalists have lost 
their jobs. Precarity is on the rise while journalistic labour is rationalized, in part, through the 
introduction of ICTs (Compton and Benedetti, 2010). Rather than reductively or instrumentally 
reflecting the interests of dominant corporations, however, we argue that through resistance and 
degrees of organized political consciousness, the technological fetish discerned in the survey's 
responses reflects or, more accurately, refracts the more general fetishistic thinking that pervades 
capitalist societies. The fetish also refracts the 'common sense' interpretations of individual and 
collective experiences [6].   
 Although the power of ICTs has been abstracted into something that is somehow an 
autonomous (and even magical) force, this is not to deny that the technological changes that have 
become so integrated into daily life are not real. Revisting Habermas’s (1970) technology as 
ideology thesis, Eran Fisher (2007) argues that: 
The strength of ideologies comes not from them being a veil on reality but a 
particular uncovering thereof. Vis-à-vis neoliberal theory, in the context of a 
technologically-saturated society, where more and more of social life is weaved into 
information technology, the digital discourse, as an ideology of technology, is all the 
more 'truer', making itself all the more ready for affirmation by technological reality; a 
'self-evident truth'. (Fisher, 2007: para. 51) 
Indeed, we argue that the power of the fetish lies in the fact that digital technologies help to 
constitute the moment-to-moment labour of the journalist and his/her interactions with others. The 
individual, whether a full-time, part-time or freelance labourer, working primarily as a news 
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reporter, feature writer, social media blogger, editor, or something else, increasingly acts and thinks 
– independently and in relation to others – through such technologies. “Reporting has become 
internet based,” states one survey respondent, “with the majority of source contact coming 
electronically.” According to another, reflecting on his/her constant connection to others through 
digital media, “God help us when the next major platform becomes a 'must-do' – our brains may 
implode.” And yet another says that because of ICTs “I am never 'off the clock'.” 
 Let us quote one more who puts it as follows: “Digital technology doesn't affect my work -- 
it is my work.” 
 Again, while these statements reflect the concrete role played by digital technologies in 
contemporary journalism, the powers attributed to ICTs are not just straightforward reflections of 
material relations. They are, more precisely, refractions. By using this word conceptually we are 
able to recognize both the relative autonomy of human agency (i.e. the thinking capabilities of the 
journalistic worker) and the magical qualities of the fetish. As we will later show, a number of 
respondents to the survey's questions demonstrate an implicit awareness of this complexity. 
 The point that digital ICTs do not inherently possess the capabilities prescribed to them but 
that these powers exist because others relate to one another as if they do, can be clarified through 
the notion of common sense (Gramsci, 1971: 332–5, 419-25). According to Antonio Gramsci, 
common sense is a way of thinking that, despite its empirical and logical shortcomings, serves as a 
useful guide in people's lives. As with the fetish, this usefulness involves the fact that others also act 
as if certain matters makes sense. Gramsci contrasts common sense with what he calls good sense 
which entails a conscious understanding of the complexities, dualisms, and even the fetishisms that 
pervade everyday life. [7]  
 “Money can't buy you happiness” is useful common sense but, when applying good sense, 
the claim becomes questionable as layers of ideological baggage are revealed and complex 
structural conditions and inequalities become discernible. Similarly, as almost every journalist 
knows, the 'freedoms' and 'opportunities' associated with ICTs make sense. However, when asked to 
exercise good sense on the matter, most (as some survey responses indicate) recognize their 
dependency on digital technology and realize that the freedoms and efficiencies at hand are largely 
outcomes of the impracticality of doing and retaining their jobs without them (Davis, 2013: 7-18). 
For one respondent, ICTs have enabled him/her to be “more flexible, creative and faster.” Another 
says, however, that “Without digital technology, I would have no job”. 
 The fetish, as a materially-based relational development, cannot be eradicated through 
critical reflection alone (through the application of good sense). Instead, it constitutes what Žižek 
refers to as an “objective illusion” (2006: 340). Rather than the predominance of some form of false 
thinking (for example, assuming that new technologies are themselves compelling journalism to 
change), the more pressing puzzle stems from people recognizing the falsity of such claims yet 
acting as if they are true. (Žižek, 2006; Sloterdijk, 1987: 20). 
 Journalistic workers in Canada live and work in a capitalist society. With regard to capitalist 
profit-motives, this implies the predominance of relations among and mediated through things (for 
Marx, “commodity forms”). Fundamental to these relations are businesses and other interests that 
are systemically driven to implement more efficient ways to produce, distribute, and sell 
commodities, while people are compelled to develop and sell their labouring capabilities for a wage. 
For both the capitalist and worker (or most employers and employees) this entails ways of living, 
relating, and thinking that are atomizing: social relations tend to be individualistic, competitive, and 
explicitly or implicitly dominated by exchange values. In these general conditions, the fetish 
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constitutes a lived and ideational expression of everyday 'thingified' relations. The possession of 
things – including the commodified capacity to labour (what Marx called “labour power”) – 
becomes a condition for (and directly influences) the nature of one's participation (Burris, 1988: 6). 
As such, mediating things, including technologies, have no independent existence: they reflect and 
refract various other social forms (e.g. structured political economic interests, ideologies, 
professional ideals, etc.). According to John Michael Roberts, while “much of the activity of 
everyday life operates beyond the immediate confines of the capitalist mode of production ... [this 
mediated life is] enmeshed within the confines of capitalist social relations wherein a diverse array 
of social forms permeate one another” (Roberts, 2002: 100). 
 Everyday relations and thoughts thus take place through the mediation of life through things 
and, today, a seemingly endless number of relations are mediated through technological means. As 
Val Burris puts it, social arrangements “once visibly the product of human agency now appear as 
technological imperatives... As technology acquires a particular social form, human behavior is 
made to 'personify' (i.e. accommodate itself to) patterns of social organization compatible with the 
accumulated mass of technology” (Burris, 1988: 16). This critical perspective, Burris insists, avoids 
an instrumentalist conceptualization of ideology; one in which structured ideas are simply the direct 
products of some kind of imposed manipulation (10). The latter conceptualization “presupposes a 
degree of unity and class consciousness among the ruling class that is empirically questionable”; “it 
fails to explain why particular forms of ideological mystification occur rather than others”; it 
represents “ideologies as simple rationalizations of [self-conscious and freely created] ruling-class 
interests”; and it tends to treat members of subordinate classes as “passive objects of manipulation” 
(11). By foregrounding reification generally and the fetish specifically, Burris follows Marx in 
countering these problems – problems that emerge when inter-subjective realities are assessed 
primarily as the outcomes of deliberate actions and manipulated beliefs. 
Readers familiar with technological determinism – technologies and techniques as aloof yet 
decisive social agents (Webster, 1995: 39) – and, more particularly, critiques of it, will recognize 
this instrumentalism. While, for determinists, “technology will ultimately impose its own discipline 
and its own patterns over and above the efforts of specific agents…”, critics, such as Raymond 
Williams, emphasize the social contexts and powerful interests that tend to dominate a technology’s 
development and implementation (Freedman, 2002: 427). And while, for Williams, technology has 
a “complex and variable connection with other social relations and institutions” (quoted in 
Freedman, 2002: 429), he argues that the seeming inevitability of a technology is “a product of the 
overt and covert marketing of the relevant interests” (Williams, 1985: 133). While we have no 
fundamental argument with this approach, our emphasis on fetishism rather than determinism better 
fleshes out the implications of technologies and techniques. A direct awareness of the fetish enables 
us to escape a dichotomy in which material relations are prioritized over a secondary ideational 
level. In sum, the fetish enables us to recognize that the technologies mediating social relations are 
deeply institutionally constitutive of capitalist relations both in toto and in the context of a particular 
place and time (such as Canada in the early twenty-first century). 
Technological fetishism and the survey 
The views garnered through our survey regarding the impact of digital technologies on journalistic 
labour were varied. A relatively small number of respondents express enthusiasm, another minority 
have disdain for them, while most say they are both helpful and harmful. This mix of responses 
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entails one commonality, however: they involve some form of fetishistic thinking. Most commonly 
we see this in the view that ICTs are somehow acting on journalists and compelling employers to 
change their practices. “I work almost entirely in digital technology,” writes one respondent, “it 
increases workload immensely but seems to be the way forward.” Another expresses a similar 
perspective but in a way that makes his/her sense of engulfment more explicit: “At present the 
technology threatens to disintegrate many jobs in the graphic design area of journalism. Instead of 
the technology being a tool to help people, it now seems to be destroying people's livelihoods.” Yet 
another expresses a similar viewpoint, emphasizing the power of technology to the exclusion of the 
economic interests and political decisions underlying its development and use: 
“It [digital technology] has added significantly to my workload. I'm still expected to 
complete  the same amount of stories, but the work for each one has easily tripled. 
Instead of just writing an article, I now have to shoot video, take photos, come up with 
something for social media and try to add some kind of interactive online feature. 
There is no time.” 
These and many other respondents also convey the common sense perspective that contemporary 
changes to journalism are unstoppable. There is, of course, a concreteness to this view as fetishistic 
thinking is experienced in terms of real alienation and insecurity. Common sense responses, such as 
“There is more to do, but more tools to do it with”, are popular perhaps because they constitute a 
means of coping and/or making sense of a seemingly uncontrollable predicament. 
 A final theme that is discernible, at least in the comments of a significant minority, 
expresses both technological fetishism and common sense in terms of what might be called the 
myth of entrepreneurial journalism. Briefly, this is a much circulated notion that digital 
technologies and the related transformation of journalism are liberating and perhaps even 
democratizing both for journalists and polities. Rather than news and other information services 
being dominated by a small number of corporate entities, the coming of more entrepreneurial forms 
of journalism is lauded as a means of freeing journalists from formerly restrictive institutional 
practices and career possibilities. In our survey, such celebratory comments are in the minority but 
they do constitute a significant and ascendant perspective. Such is evident in the following 
response: 
“I am incredibly grateful for social media outlets, especially Twitter, for giving me a 
platform to share and promote my work. As a young journalist, I don't know a better 
way to promote myself while also hearing feedback and ideas from a growing 
audience. In turn, editors recognize I have an audience, and I've been told recently by 
one editor that they want my ideas because they want a younger audience. I'm also 
grateful for my second-hand iPhone, which allows me to live-tweet and take notes and 
photos on the fly. It has made my job easier and faster.” 
Another respondent writes that “[w]ithout it [digital technology] I wouldn't have become a 
journalist. It means I can find out where interview subjects will be and when, so the whole of the 
English speaking world is a potential place to place pieces.” The promotional notion that ICTs not 
only create more opportunities but also provide journalists with the means of attaining the market 
ideal of efficiency is indicated in this text messaging-like remark: “Provided new opportunities. 
Enormous time savings. (No more lining up at libraries!)” 
 “My bosses,” says another, “have deluded themselves into thinking they put digital first – 
they don't. Most decisions put print first and they’ve tied our ability to be nimble to the print front-
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end publishing system.” In other words, if only the employer more forcefully compelled journalists 
to 'go digital' the company he/she is working for would do better by enabling them to be more 
“nimble.”  
Echoing this entrepreneurial zeal, another respondent states that, quite simply, digital 
technologies yield “More jobs (++)”. 
 We hypothesize that many of these respondents are, relatively speaking, young or 
inexperienced journalistic workers whose job security is limited. We also think they might be (again 
relatively) more 'at home' with new technologies than their colleagues given that they have likely 
used digital ICTs all their working lives and associate them with their jobs. If this is generally 
correct we are left with an apparent exception to our earlier explication of the fetish as something 
people know is false yet act as if it is true (at least when pushed to think about it). Is this minority – 
echoing promotional literature about a new 'golden age of journalism' – an example of the insightful 
perspectives of a marginalized group, or is it, more astonishingly, a reflection (not a reflexion) of 
the fetish itself as a medium of delusional thinking (a view that Marx saw as far too simplistic)? We 
think it is neither. 
 Following G.A. Cohen's analysis of Marx’s writings on “the dialectic of labour” (Cohen, 
1988: 187-195), the tangible freedom experienced through the use of technology is not free of 
constraints. Journalism is critically understood to be an increasingly efficiency-focused, multi-task-
oriented, and tenuous occupation by all but these more celebratory respondents. Here we have a 
glimpse of the contradictions experienced by journalists working in digitally-mediated newsrooms. 
Digital technologies do open up creative possibilities for reporters and editors. Indeed, many of the 
journalism trade journals run features and commentaries on the potential of new media technologies 
to democratize forms of storytelling, including the participation of so-called citizen journalists. 
Again, these potentialities are not mere delusions; they are – seen dialectically – utopian 
possibilities that are often negated by the dominant political economy of corporate convergence, 
labour rationalization and the short-term profit imperatives of finance capital (Baker, 2007; Skinner 
et al., 2005; Winseck, 2010). As Debra Clarke correctly notes, alongside the “digital ‘ultra-
optimism’” of media managers “there has sometimes been a regrettable tendency … to dwell upon 
digitization and the digital technology itself to the relative neglect of the underlying economic 
conditions and wider social structures into which the technology has been inserted” (Clarke, 2014: 
97-98).       
 In this political and economic context, it is quite possible that a worker can recognize his/her 
dependency on technology while not fully comprehending its role as a barrier (against realizing 
some kind of job security or the obtaining of the time necessary to fully assess information and 
sources before filing a report). To use an analogy, someone might clearly see a closed door but, 
thinking he/she is free to come and go, remain unaware that it is locked. The point here is that in 
order for the engulfing mechanisms of the fetish to be removed, the worker must at least understand 
the material nature of their contradictory situation – a situation we elaborate further below. 
Organization, political capacity and the fetish 
The significance of technological fetishism is further disclosed in the responses to questions 
concerning union representation. Several tensions are found in the respondents’ answers. There was 
a general division between the views of what we assume to be newer/younger journalists and those 
of their more experienced colleagues. For many of the former, unions deemed as exclusionary and 
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protective of more established workers. We know from the survey that older journalists tend to be 
more unionized are more likely to be members of some other collective organization. The survey 
also reveals that non-unionized workers are less likely to be paid for all their labour: more than half 
(51.9%) report that they are not paid for all their working hours while those who are unionized are 
more likely to say that they are fully remunerated. This situation among the non-unionized, we 
speculate, is due to their relatively tenuous status and their integration into work routines through 
continuous and untethered digital connections. Despite these conditions, some of these respondents 
blame unions for slowing or retarding their employers' adoption of technology (which they mostly 
rate as a necessary advance). Others (most of whom we believe to be more experienced and secure 
workers) see unions as a buffer against over-work and the threat of job losses. 
 We suggest that the technological fetish is mediating these different views. While fetishistic 
thinking is pervasive in capitalist political economies, we postulate that the extent to which digital 
ICTs have constituted the tools of one's everyday labour influences the journalist's understanding of 
his/her craft and professional capabilities. Newer journalists, we assume, have used an array of 
digital technologies all of their working lives while the more senior may not have this background 
(at least not in terms of the depth and breadth of their everyday application). To repeat, experienced 
journalists are more likely to be unionized and hold more secure positions. In some instances, this 
may structurally and conceptually help them to be relatively detached from (rather than engulfed in) 
what has become a norm for most: the full integration of ICTs into work practices and their 
sustainability [8].  
 The embrace of technologies especially among some of the less experienced and 
unorganized journalistic workers occurs as these same technologies are being used to facilitate the 
very insecurities and inequalities that underly the tensions and divisions among journalists. In this 
regard, we turn to responses to the survey questions concerning unions. 
 One respondent states that “The union seems more interested in protecting pensions and 
senior workers who don't contribute much. Their actions prevent the hiring of younger journalists 
with much-needed digital skills.” According to another, “If it wasn't for the union protecting jobs in 
bloated corporate departments and stomping their feet over short-term contracts, I would likely be 
employed right now.” To quote a similar perspective: “Unions are resistant to changes in job roles 
that we need to make in order to keep up with digital transformation.” Others, however, recognize 
the potential worth of unions – one stating that “It's good to have union protection for this industry 
these days”. Another perceives them to be uncaring “about work conditions like tasks definition, 
workload [sic] and never tries to stop multitasking.” 
 In other comments, respondents share their experiences and perceptions of digital 
technology as an indispensable and, indeed, powerful force. In fact, this objective illusion appears 
to be mediating how some conceptualize the activities of organized labour itself. “I think a union 
would impose too much structure on a profession that requires flexibility,” remarks one, who 
continues that “Unions are resistant to changes in job roles that we need to make in order to keep up 
with digital transformation.” Another writes that while “[i]t's great to have support and advocacy for 
things like wages, overtime and security ... [unions] can also lead to some workforce inertia where 
things don't evolve, and that can limit opportunities.” One respondent who seems to be expressing 
what might well be a refracted assessment of new technologies states that “[i]n an industry that is 
under siege, union membership at least allows the illusion of having some control over my work 
environment and conditions.” 
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 The fetish, to reiterate, stems from very real 'thingified' relations but is not simplistically 
determined by such conditions. Instead, the power of a thing is accepted largely because it is acted 
upon by others. Money, for example, really does have power – not inherently but, rather, in a 
society in which people use it to express, exercise, or resist power. Similarly, digital technologies, 
even though they are just things, are developed and used to empower some over others and to 
enable workers to do powerful things for themselves and others. Journalistic workers, especially 
those who use them or are dependent on them in ways that are deeply constitutive, thus are not 
'wrong' in recognizing the power of technology. Nevertheless, as we have suggested, this power 
entails the obfuscation of engulfing conditions and dependency relationships. Such conditions and 
relationships are positioned within still more complex political-economic relations (as well as 
common sense norms and contradictory ways of thinking and acting). However, it is important to 
point out that a small number of respondents to the survey demonstrate some keen insights that 
reveal, we think, at least a fragmentary recognition that the predominant common sense may not be 
good sense. Some comments, like the following, are peppered with industry jargon, yet show some 
awareness about the relationship between economic forces and assumed technological capabilities: 
 “The workload has more than doubled, without a corresponding increase in salary, staffing 
or revenue for the company. Ad agencies do not know how to connect with the clients of their 
clients, so they are pushing a digital agenda that we need to buy into in order to secure revenue... 
Younger buyers push digital without concern for whether it will reach the desired audience... It is 
not unusual to generate a quarter (or less) revenue from a digital property that takes the same 
amount of work as a traditional media project. This is part of the reason most print publishers have 
simply pushed responsibilities for digital projects (website, blogging, social media) onto existing 
print staff, and that is stretching the staffing levels dangerously thin, and weakening the deliverables 
considerably.” 
 Other respondents similarly recognize that the economic and technological developments at 
hand are having deleterious consequences for the quality of what is produced: 
“Publishers want copy for the web but pay very little for it. They also want it more 
quickly than copy for traditional print. There seems to be little to no concern about 
quality or fact checking.” 
“The ability for everyone to self-publish has devalued the written word and make 
media employers feel justified in paying next to nothing.” 
“I am often expected to tweet and send copy to the web during the news event I am 
covering. This distracts me from the event that I am covering and makes it more 
difficult to analyze the event and ask effective questions.” 
“It [digital technology] has increased the stress level, workload, you name it. 
Everything must be tweeted as information is available, sitting down and writing a 
coherent, well-thought out story seems an afterthought.” 
Others are even more explicit in expressing a sense of powerlessness while also understanding the 
profit motives underlying technology's rapid deployment: 
“[Digital technology has d]ramatically increased my workload and expectations of 
me... no real room for intelligence given constant demand to feed the goat...” 
“The fact is the more one can produce the more you must produce.” 
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These and most other journalistic workers recognize the political-economic interests and dynamics 
behind the radical changes underway, yet there is also a palpable sense of resignation, acceptance, 
or celebratory enthusiasm which we take to be varied expressions of the technological fetish in 
action.   
Conclusions 
The struggle starts from where we are and what we are; the struggle is a refusal of 
where we are and what we are: we are in-and-against, against-and-in. But more than 
that: in order to be sustained, the struggle in-and-against must become a moving 
against-and-beyond...         
John Holloway (2005: 39). 
Given the precarious nature of contemporary journalism and the deeply contradictory experience of 
journalistic labour and the potentially unsustainable nature of the craft/profession, other ways of 
structuring journalistic labour and the institution of journalism are urgently needed (Compton and 
Benedetti, 2015; McChesney and Nichols, 2010). Furthermore, given the relative security and 
economic resources of the unionized journalist, our findings suggest that this alternative structure 
might well involve a deeper and wider organization of Canadian journalists as a workforce. Beyond 
this general point is the complex of relationships involving digital technologies, political-economic 
dynamics, and vested interests. Here, we have suggested that the technological fetish is playing a 
significant but under assessed role, particularly in how different journalists (influenced by their 
experiences, job security, and organizational status) perceive their work in light of technological 
change. 
 Digital technologies, we have argued, are constitutive of journalistic practices and, indeed, 
the political capacities of journalistic workers. The common sense that journalism 'must change 
with the times' is variously challenged by different (i.e. relatively autonomous) journalists whose 
capacities to exercise good sense derives from certain material conditions and structured 
capabilities. We have also argued that despite the secondary status of good sense thinking, the 
fetish itself, through its development, is at least conceptually penetrable. We conclude with the 
general observation from our survey that journalistic workers are experiencing a sense of 
empowerment through their use of digital technologies but that this has been accompanied by a less 
discernible form of disempowerment. For some, this state of affairs – what might be termed an 
engulfed freedom [9] – is not readily perceived while, for others, this engulfment is recognized but 
seen to be largely inescapable. 
 As Marx understood, a person can only be suitably independent and free of such 
engulfments after the constitutive relations of this condition are recognized and structurally 
reformed or removed. The puzzle as to why journalistic workers continue to act on something they 
know to be false is now comprehensible. The technological fetish is rooted in relational conditions 
and everyday practices and it is from here, and not just in the mind, that political action is required. 
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Endnotes 
[1]  “Engulfment” refers to a condition of unrecognized constraint. Someone who 
is aware of being in some way constrained has the capacity to at least 
conceptualize what stands in the way of her freedom, while the individual who 
cannot recognize the relationship or condition or structure as such is engulfed 
by it. A simple analogy is that of the child engulfed by their parents: as G.A. 
Cohen puts it, “he knows them to be separate from him, yet does not know 
himself to be separate from them” (Cohen, 1988: 188). 
[2]  No self-identifying information was collected. The completion rate was 77%. 
An initial report on the survey was presented in the following year. See Nicole 
Cohen, Edward Comor and James R. Compton, et al. (2014) Journalistic 
Labour and Digital Transformation: A Survey of Working Conditions. Paper 
presented at the Canadian Association of Work and Labour Studies 
conference, Brock University, 29-30 May. 
[3]  Journalist incomes, on the whole, are similar to some comparable occupations, 
where the median wage is in the $40-60,000 range. In recent years, however, 
these wages generally have declined in relation to inflation. By factoring in the 
rate of inflation between 2008-2012 (when prices in Canada rose 6.64%), 
56.3% of respondents experienced a significant reduction of their real incomes. 
Almost 43% depend on the income of a spouse, 13.7% of respondents depend 
on credit cards, and 11.2% state that they depend on bank loans or lines of 
credit. 
[4]  According to Georg Lukács, reified capitalist relations undermine the 
bourgeoisie’s ability to fully comprehend its own structural conditions. For the 
working class, however, its different relationship to capital entails at least the 
potential to profoundly understand such conditions. For him, thought is both 
cognitive and creative; i.e. it does not simplistically reflect a concrete reality 
but, instead, knowledge is the outcome of one’s active engagement with it. 
Indeed, reification, as a structural outcome of Marx’s more general commodity 
form, is seen to be nothing less than “the central structural problem of 
capitalist society…” (Lukács, 1971, p. 83).  
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[5]  In accordance with this dual reality, Marx also argued that workers, especially 
when experiencing immiseration, could collectively recognize the constructed 
nature of their situations and thus their political capabilities in relation to 
capital. See, for example, Marx and Engels (1979). 
[6]  In arguing that the technological fetish refracts more general fetishistic and 
common sense thinking, we allude to notions of causality that are more 
complex and mediated than reductive or instrumentalist. Rather than arguing 
that the technological fetish is generally a direct reflection or mirroring of 
reified and fetishized conditions, we recognize that different and complex 
levels of causality are at work which involve degrees of relatively autonomous 
action. In turn, technological fetishism constitutes what might be termed a 
mediating abstraction: the mediating process often constitutes refracted 
interactions and conceptualizations. For an elaboration of this methodological 
approach, see Roberts (2013). 
[7]  Common sense also reflects a form of knowledge attained through crude forms 
of empiricism or shared sensations, while good sense consciously (and 
‘scientifically’) conceptualizes another form of knowledge that is both 
conditioned by, and open to, reflexive analyses. Rather than reflecting some 
kind of false/true dichotomy, for Gramsci this common sense/good sense 
formulation constituted, in part, a pedagogical device crafted to impel reflexive 
thinking. “Philosophy,” as Gramsci put it, “is criticism and the superseding of 
religion and 'common sense'. In this sense it coincides with 'good sense' as 
opposed to 'common sense'” (Gramsci, 1971: 326). 
[8]  In the survey, journalists who are not unionized report higher levels of job 
insecurity. A statistical analysis reveals a strong positive relationship 
(significant at the .001 level) between respondents who are not represented by 
a union and those earning an inadequate income. Unionized journalists – 
constituting 43.1% of respondents – are more likely to earn higher incomes 
and report these to be adequate. 
[9]  By “freedom” we include a person's freedom to sell his/her labour power to 
anyone who contracts it. 
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